Liverpool FC: Reviewing the 2023/24 Season Performance and Assessing The Key Priorities For Arne Slot

Following on from our Season Review show (You can listen if not already here: https://www.theanfieldwrap.com/2024/05/podcast-liverpool-fc-23-24-season-the-review/) I promised to publish the StatsBomb graphics and provide some additional thoughts on the season as a whole.

Specifically:

· Review the eyes vs data test in some key areas

· Consider individual player’s output: Specifically, Diaz, Trent and Szoboszlai

· Consider Arne Slot’s immediate priorities and key areas for improvement.

References to XG are expected goals. Percentile references are in respect of StatsBomb’s data compared to everyone in the Premier League for that specific metric. The closer you are to 100 percentile the better you are in that metric. Vice versa the lower you are (e.g. closer to the 1st percentile) the worse you are compared to the rest of the league within the specific metric.

Best to start at the beginning. What did the 2022/23 season numbers tell us heading into the 2023/24 season?

2022–23 Season

• 5th: 67 points
• Goals scored: 75 goals (3rd highest in the league)
• Goals Conceded: 47 goals (7th “best” defensive record).

This marked a solid attacking performance but highlighted our defensive weaknesses.

Rightfully there were serious concerns surrounding the midfield throughout the season. They were not the only concerns though…..

2022/23 Statistical Analysis — Per Game Averages

Liverpool’s average expected goals (xG) per game was 1.72 xG, compared to 1.14 xG against.

The team averaged 15.89 shots per game while allowing 9.74 shots against per game.

Liverpool’s attacking performance was impressive, with high metrics across the board. The 3 areas of the attack below the 90th percentile were:

· xG per shot: 0.11 (85th percentile)

· High press shots: 3.21 (81st percentile)

· Box cross success rate: 26% (87th percentile)

Being picky if you wanted to improve on the attacking numbers in the 2023/24 season you would maintain the attacking metrics and improve in these three areas above from the 2022/23 season.

Defensive Metrics

Defensively, Liverpool were poor in most defensive metrics both with the eyes and on the data.

Liverpool excelled in two areas:

- Limiting shots: Shots conceded: 9.74 (90+ percentile)

- Pressing metrics: All in the 90+ percentile range (more on this below)

Despite these strengths, Liverpool had notable defensive weaknesses (Per Game Averages):

· xG per shot conceded: 0.12 (4th percentile)

· Counter-attacking shots conceded: 1.34 (17th percentile)

· Clear shots conceded: 2.61 (27th percentile)

· xG conceded: 1.14 (56th percentile)

· Set-piece xG conceded: 0.23 (69th percentile)

2022/23 End Of Season Defensive Concerns

Pressing & Transition

I felt during the 2022/23 season, we largely pressed well when we were facing a team playing out from the back. The shape covered up a number of weaknesses in the midfield area.

The issues were in transition and/or when Liverpool were high up the pitch.

The failure of Liverpool’s a) team structure, b) midfield to counter press/cover gaps effectively, and c) attack in a compact way, led to Liverpool conceding far too many high-value chances, conceding far too many counter attacks, and conceding far too many goals thereafter.

Set pieces

Defending set pieces was also a problem and this begs the question of how much of this was down to the setup and how much of this was down to personnel?

Tactical Change End Of 2022/23 Season: The Box Midfield

Out of possession, Liverpool continued to defend in Klopp’s preferred 4–3–3 shape (one of the few coaches that still does with Guardiola and Arteta favouring an Italian “Sacchi” style 442 defensive shape)

Against Arsenal at home and for the rest of the “Big 9” Liverpool changed their shape in possession mirroring the shape used by Arsenal in possession and relatively regularly by Manchester City, namely the 3–2–2–3.

In possession:

• Andy Robertson would tuck in making the “3”
• Trent would invert and sit alongside Fabinho.
• The two 8’s would occupy the two upper “box” positions
• The front 3 provided the additional width offered by both wingers (Salah and Diaz) being asked to pull wider — at least in the build-up phase.
• Curtis Jones and Harvey Elliott frequently overlapped and underlapped, while Andy Robertson provided support selectively.

Whilst similar on paper to Arsenal, and when applied by Manchester City, Liverpool’s version was more flexible. It was not as rigid as say Arsenal. There are obvious pros and cons to this. The greater flexibility aids attacking flexibility but increases the risks defensively and in transition.

The pass network from Liverpool v Tottenham in April 2023 illustrates this:

Summer 2023: Klopp Priorities | Areas for Improvement

The focus on the pitch from a tactical perspective had to be improving the defensive numbers particularly:

· Reducing counter-attacking shots conceded

· Improving set-piece defending

· Reducing the clear chances conceded especially on the counterattack

The midfield needed a revamp and we needed to attack in a better structure to enable counter-pressing and the team shape to improve Liverpool defensively.

Transfer Business 2023

With the saga surrounding a defensive midfielder, bids from Saudi for Henderson, Fabinho, Salah, and concern any additional surprise bids could come in at any time resulted in this being a pretty hectic summer for Klopp.

Senior players who had a big impact around the training ground departed and a new leadership group needed to be formed.

The late arrivals of Endo and Gravenberch were welcomed but timing wise it would have helped if they had returned much earlier and benefitted from a full pre-season. Harvey Elliot and Curtis Jones excelled at the Under 21’s tournament but the knock-on effect from this was the disruption to their pre-season and the knock-on effect at the start of the season as a result.

Another challenge for the manager was to ensure the senior players were ready to “go again” and attack the season knowing how intense both Klopp’s football would be. Were they “up” for the challenge in terms of getting back in the Champions League and competing against Arsenal and Manchester City? Could they go again? Would they go again?

It appeared that the new signings were made with a view to defending in the 4-3-3 shape and in the build up phase in possession to the 3–2–2–3 shape.

Transfers In

Dominik Szoboszlai

Alexis Mac Allister

Wataru Endo (post-season start)

Ryan Gravenberch (post-season start)

Transfers Out

Jordan Henderson

Fabinho

Roberto Firmino

James Milner

Naby Keita

Fabio Carvalho (loan)

2023/24 Pre-Season Setup and Expectations

During pre-season, Liverpool set up as they had done at the end of the 2022/23 season. Seemingly the 3–2–2–3 in possession with Trent inverted shape was here to stay.

Gakpo played deeper than Salah and Jota, with MacAllister and Szoboszlai in advanced midfield roles. Notably, they were inverted with MacAlister on the right and Szoboszlai in the left 8 role.

A minor concern, particularly against Bayern Munich but throughout pre-season generally, was the continuing weakness when defending set pieces and being vulnerable to counterattacks.

Season Expectations

Most Liverpool fan's opinions were that Champions League qualification and a trophy win, either the Europa League (seemed very winnable) or the League Cup most likely, would be judged a successful season.

It also seemed a pretty big challenge.

Chelsea’s summer business, Newcastle and Manchester United having qualified for the Champions League, Manchester City, and Arsenal being pretty solid bets to retain Champions League qualification, resulted in those pre-season aims potentially being no easy thing to achieve. Especially with the turnover in players and crucially the timing of them during the summer.

My personal KPI every season is for Liverpool to be on 62-68 points after 28 games. Beat the bottom 10 home and away whilst having a strong home record.

If you can be on 62–68 points after 28 games then Champions League qualification from this point on should be a formality and if you can win 9+ of the remaining games you will go very close to winning the title breaking 90 points in the process (or not as the case may be as we have cruelly found out far too regularly!)

2023/24 Season Performance

Tactics

Having not secured the defensive midfielder we initially wanted this caused an issue in respect of who would start the season as the “6” and the knock-on effects of who moved in to this role.

MacAllister starts the season in the 6 of course. We had no natural 6 and even after Endo arrived, he does not start games in the league consistently until December.

Throughout the season we broadly defend in the typical 433 high press Klopp style.

More interesting is what we do with the ball and with whom.

At the start of the season in possession we are in the 3–2–2–3 shape with MacAllister in the 6 role, Gakpo the left 8 with Szoboszlai the right 8, and Trent inverting.

Trent appears to have almost a free role as opposed to the more rigid role adopted by Arsenal and Manchester City when their fullbacks invert.

At home to Aston Villa is the most obvious example in respect of the Trent role. Whilst fulfilling his defensive duties as a right back, in possession Trent can go and find the space. Often, he inverts, especially early season, but we have seen spells in games later in the season where he is more orthodox, sometimes higher, sometimes deeper. Against Aston Villa at home, he is almost a third centre back and this works very well as with Villa’s aggressive defensive line Trent can play Salah and Nunez in over the top at will during the first half.

In addition, our two 8s push up into the roles behind the front 3 and they are often going on the outside-in (overlapping the wingers) when we are in the final third allowing the front 3 to contract and move closer to goal.

Against Villa, we also see Curtis Jones really cement his role as the left 8 with Gakpo now a bench option post Nunez catching fire post Newcastle.

With Trent’s early season injury, we see Gomez invert at times and be more orthodox in others.

Tactical change in possession

From West Ham at home in late September, we seem to move away from our left back forming a back 3 in possession of the ball.

In 95% plus games from this point on we build out with a back 2 regardless of who is at full-back. This continues in the subsequent games and throughout most of the season.

We will probably never know but it would be fascinating to learn (well at least to me!) why the coaching staff decided to move away from the 3–2–2–3 in possession build-up shape and in the build-up phase use two centre backs solely for the remainder of the season.

Start To Season — Away Form

The home form is outstanding both in terms of performance and results.

The first 7 away games end up being quite costly in the long run. It was a tricky start on the road.

Away to Chelsea, Newcastle, Spurs, Wolves, Brighton, Luton, Manchester City as your first 7 is not ideal with the summer we had.

Despite being tough on paper 10 points from 21 available is not really good enough if wanting to win the league and the performances on the ball in those games was largely inconsistent or not good enough depending upon your view.

Mitigation of course with Newcastle and Spurs but for large spells, especially in the first half of many of these games, the on-ball performance was not very good, and chalk and cheese compared to what we were seeing at home in terms of both performances and results.

It is also noteworthy there is no clean sheet in those first 7 away games.

Best periods Of Season Analysis | xG Data

When you review the xG trend line graphic from StatsBomb the xG performance matches the actual results gleaned during the two most high-performing periods of the season namely:

1) 21st October 2023 (Everton h) to 31st January 2024 (Chelsea h): Liverpool won 10 out of 14 league games, drawing 4, and securing 34 points out of 42.

2) 10th February 2024 (Burnley h) to 13th April 2024 (Manchester United a): Liverpool won 6 out of 8 games, drawing 2 and losing 0, securing 20 points from 24.

Brentford Away Impact

Something I do not believe has had as much attention as perhaps it should is the Brentford away fixture. This was an absolute killer. A strange thing to say after such an emphatic performance and result.

Liverpool go into the game in good form with many senior players absolutely purring.

Jones and Jota are injured, Salah has to play too many minutes as a replacement for Jota and suffers a recurrence of his injury and Nunez is injured at the end of the game with a foot injury that was allegedly still troubling him for the remainder of the campaign.

None of the four ever truly recover their fitness and form despite all making it back onto the pitch through the remainder of the campaign. The game had frustrating similarities with Everton away in 2020/21 with the Thiago and Van Dijk injuries that day.

Trent and Thiago’s injuries during fixtures against Arsenal really hurt too. Thiago in particular would have been helpful to rotate MacAllister, especially in those final 10 games of the season with his experience and ability.

March International Break: An Opportunity Missed?

The international break preceded the run-in starting with Brighton at home.

I said on one of our Review shows around the time I wanted us to return from the international break a defensively serious football team. Be absolutely ruthless. Tighten up at set pieces. Be brave to go 442/451 without the ball and soak it up. Battle mode. Ruthless no risk defending. Clean sheets and aggression. 10 games and we need to be conceding 6 or less for me in that period. Start games with territory and not allowing opponents a sniff.

From Brighton to Everton inclusive we have just one game with an xG conceded under 0.50.

We concede 8 goals in 6 games.

We go 1–0 down in those 6 crucial games on 3 occasions.

We should score on xG 14 goals in these 6 games and score 10.

The players who had carried the fight ran out of legs, form, or both. MacAllister a perfect example whilst a lot of the returning players could not find any rhythm or peak fitness most likely. Big players through the spine lost their battles.

I am disappointed that during the international break the coaching staff didn’t have the plan and execution with the players to really set up strong defensively, to be compact in possession, being difficult to counter on, and being in no-risk defending mode. Game management was appalling at times.

There was too much blue sky thinking for me as if we were playing 5 or 7 aside football. At the start of games, I feel we prioritise calmness and possession even if deep in our defensive third as opposed to prioritising territory and playing your way in with less risk. Early on in games, I want the ball in the opponent's half and to test any coldness or early weaknesses in the opposition.

The start of games was a repeatedly worrying period. The lack of intensity and allowing the opposition free hits and an opportunity to roll the dice.

Arsenal are not shy to go long or go 442 and soak it up for long periods (see Spurs and United away as just two examples of this). Arsenal showed you can control the game without needing to have the ball.

Had we done the same during key periods I have no doubt we would have won more games, particularly during the run in. The start of Palace in terms of approach was ludicrous.

From Brighton onwards Quansah starts more games to season end than Konate which was both deserved and surprising.

In Arsenal's last 10 games they conceded an XG below 0.50 on 4 occasions with every game below 1.0 XG conceded in each of the 10 games.

First 30 minutes of games

Our starts to games have been an issue with some regularity since the run in during the 2021/22 season where we made a bad habit of going 1–0 down.

To illustrate how much of a problem this was during the 2023/24 season if you created a league table from the 31st minute of every league game to full-time Liverpool would be clear top, with Arsenal 6 points behind and Manchester City 9 points behind. Our goal difference would be 1 worse than Arsenal and 1 better than Manchester City.

I appreciate this is not a stat to be relied upon as all teams are managing the game state from 30 minutes onwards, but it does illustrate the difference between the teams.

League Season

Liverpool improved significantly in the 2023/24 season, finishing 3rd with 82 points. They scored 86 goals (still 3rd highest in the league) and conceded 41, improving their defensive ranking to 3rd best in the league.

What did the advanced metrics and wider numbers tell us about the season as a whole?

Advanced Metrics and Data: StatsBomb

Comparison between Liverpool’s 2023/24 performance and 2022/23

· xG per game: 2.06 (0.34 increase on 2022/23)

· xG against per game: 1.10 (0.04 improvement on 2022/23)

· xG goal difference per game: 0.96 (0.38 increase on 2022/23)

· Shots per game: 20.71 (an increase of nearly 5 shots per game on 2022/23)

· Shots conceded per game: 10.92 (a negative increase of nearly one shot per game on 2022/23)

Attacking Metrics

Liverpool maintained high attacking performance, with metrics showing improvements in all areas except for:

· xG per shot: 0.10 (65th percentile, a decline on 2022/23)

· High press shots: 5.08 (100th percentile, an increase on 2022/23)

Defensive Metrics

The defensive performance showed mixed results. There was a low bar set on 2022/23 numbers, but this season’s performance shows there is still work to be done:

· xG per shot conceded: 0.10 (35th percentile, a 0.02 improvement on 22/23)

· Set-piece xG conceded: 0.29 (34th percentile, worse than 22/23)

· Clear shots conceded: 2.11 (60th percentile, a 0.50 improvement on 22/23)

· Counter-attacking shots conceded: 1.00 (61st percentile, a 0.34 improvement on 22/23)

· xG conceded: 1.10 (63rd percentile, a slight improvement on 22/23)

· Shots conceded: 10.92 (75th percentile, a 1.18 increase on 22/23)

We conceded far fewer clear shots than in 2022/23 but that would not be difficult based on how poor we were in that metric in the previous season.

We only conceded 6 fewer goals compared to the previous season and failed to improve on defending set pieces actually producing worse numbers this season.

Ultimately, we are not anywhere near as good as Manchester City, and particularly Arsenal, in respect of:

· Preventing clear chances

· Preventing counter attacks

· Structure and compactness in possession and transition

· Defending set pieces

Individual Attacking Output: Diaz | Szoboszlai | Trent

The performances during the final ten games of the season combined with the return of Michael Edwards and additions to the recruitment/data analytical team, a new manager, and potential for tactical changes, leads to legitimate debates surrounding a number of key senior players.

Where will Trent play?

What of the new contracts this summer?

Transfers?

Will the formation in and out of possession change? (Just because Slot played 4231 elsewhere does not mean it is a certainty he replicates that here. Klopp’s Dortmund played 4231 yet the greatest team in his career played 433)

Amongst the wider discussions, I wanted to look at the attacking output.

The return of Michael Edwards one would suspect brings the player's outputs even more markedly into the forefront of any internal review.

I analysed the goals and assists per minute across the Premier League fixtures with some interesting results from a Liverpool perspective.

Jota, Salah, and Nunez all feature prominently as you would expect.

Gakpo and Elliot’s numbers were slightly better than I suspected. Elliot in particular with a goal or assist every 149 minutes all things considered is positive.

The numbers posted by Diaz, Szoboszlai, and Trent pose more questions than answers.

In all three cases, I feel there is a question as to their best position.

Trent Role

In Trent’s case, his role since the switch to the 3–2–2–3 creates a completely different role for him compared to the forward running aggressive right back forming a front 5 with Robertson, Mane, Firmino, and Salah during the 2018–2020 period.

What is clear from Trent’s numbers is that there must be a discussion regarding whether a player with Trent’s ability in the final third is better used higher up the pitch to hit his maximum goals and assists numbers possible or whether he is better utilised in a deeper role where you will not get the same output in terms of goals and assists but will gain other benefits such as his playmaking ability, diagonal passes, forward passes (deep progressions), etc.

In addition, what role does Trent fill without the ball? Does he move back to right back, or does he become a central midfielder or a wide midfielder? Where is he best defensively?

Szoboszlai

In the case of Szoboszlai, there are more questions than answers right now.

He clearly has the talent.

A lot of top clubs reportedly did not move for him as they were not sure whether he could take that next step. Could he take the next step? Would he be consistent enough? What is his best position?

I am not sure a season on whether we are any the wiser really. An attacking midfielder can not be repeating those kind of numbers for goals and assists when we have other players in the squad who can play those roles who are already hitting better numbers.

It will be fascinating to see how the new manager uses him. I am a fan and keen to see how he develops but I do wonder what Edwards and Hughes would do if someone offered Liverpool their money back on him ….

Diaz

In the case of Diaz, I think there is an increasingly strong argument to sell him.

Again, I enjoy watching him play and if we were to play 4231/442 then I can see a strong argument for keeping him.

With his age, knee injury, and output numbers for us, if a suitable bid came in, I could see Ewards and Hughes cashing in and re-investing in a younger, dynamic wide player with the potential to hit better output numbers.

There is an argument we need two such signings. A goal or assist every 204 minutes of Premier League football is not good enough for our aims.

In addition, as discussed by Neil Atkinson on our Season Review show, Diaz is not performing well on key passes. Kevin De Bruyne leads the way as you might expect but Diaz is way down the leaderboard at Liverpool in respect of key passes per 90 minutes.

Andy Robertson as an example is a very decent percentage higher than Diaz as is Trent. The expected goals from Diaz key passes is 0.08 whereas Trent and Robertson are higher. Nunez and Salah are nearly double what Diaz’s numbers are.

Sometimes it is better the devil you know of course but his numbers this season are disappointing, and I would not be surprised if Liverpool roll the dice on this one assuming a suitable bid is received, especially as Gakpo can perform a wide-left role before you consider any new recruits.

Arne Slot Priorities

A hugely challenging task is to address how you improve the defensive performance without damaging the attacking performance.

Defending set pieces

Defending set pieces much better is the obvious starting point and this would not impact attacking performance at all.

My own view is that it is more structure and approach than personnel issues when it comes to defending set pieces, but we have a few seasons back-to-back now where the performance when defending set pieces is miles away from where we need it to be. Slot has a very good record at Feyenoord when it comes to defending set pieces and I would be very surprised if we do not see improvements in these numbers during 2024/25.

Shape in possession and transition when we lose the ball

Dare I say it, but I think Arne Slot needs to make us a little more boring. Hopefully only a touch!

In order to concede fewer clear-cut chances, concede fewer counter attacks, and ultimately concede less goals we likely need to:

· Improve game management

· Start games better with less risk and more territory

· Be more willing to put XI men behind the ball and soak up pressure (Arsenal away at Manchester United is a perfect example and was also a fantastic trait of the Liverpool side between January 2019 to December 2020)

· Attack with more rigidity and structure assisting us in transition

· Build the play with a solid 5 whether that be in a 2–3 shape or a 3–2 shape as with Manchester City & Arsenal.

Training Ground: Quality Over Quantity

With so many players away this summer, an entirely new backroom staff to integrate, and the trip to the U.S., Slot could really do with a kind opening 6 fixtures to the season.

Getting off to a good start while implementing your way of attacking, defending, transitioning, etc with the senior players who are missing significant parts of the pre-season would be extremely helpful.

The additional Champions League games and midweek fixtures will reduce the training ground time available even further this season and it is critical Slott makes every minute count on the training pitches both in pre-season and during those early weeks of the season while there are fewer mid-week games.

For any new manager keeping morale high and the early feel-good factor going for as long as possible while implementing a new approach with fresh ideas is critical. You do not want morale and belief to dip whilst you are still getting your ideas and methods across.

Transfer Business Summer 2024

I suspect Liverpool will:

· Sell Tsimikas if a suitable bid is received. They may buy a young left back to succession plan for Robertson. Owen Beck and his pre-season will likely be crucial in this decision-making process.

· Buy a centre-back (I suspect if they could find a left-sided centre-back who can cover left back this would be ideal)

· Buy at least one young, pacey, versatile attacker

· Ideally do very little business. there may be senior players who want more game time or are unhappy with their role but I suspect ideally they would like to buy a year and focus on more wholesale changes in the summer of 2025.

At the same time, I would not rule out Liverpool being opportunistic later in the window. If dominos went in certain directions causing unforeseen issues in other clubs Liverpool has the personnel in recruitment and the model to move swiftly and make the right decisions quicker than most with Edwards, Hughes, Fallows, Hunter, etc. Especially as by then the manager’s thoughts on players young and old may be a little clearer.

I personally would sell Diaz for the right offer and replace him.

I would consider selling Endo too.

Despite the presence of Bajcetic signing another young central midfielder with the potential to be a top 6 would be something I would be looking to do. It is very difficult to buy a top 6 off the shelf. Liverpool signing a midfielder is highly unlikely but a player in general to keep your eye on would be Hugo Larsson at Frankfurt. I would be surprised if a top Premier League team does not take a chance on him over the next 12 months. He is not ready yet but could develop into a 6 who starts regularly for Champions League-level clubs.

Overall

The 2023–24 season was an incredible effort. So near but yet so far.

When you consider the season prior, the new arrivals, chaos of the summer market, the injuries, early red cards galore, legitimate goals chalked off, the manager announcing his forthcoming departure, and bloody kidnappings, it begs the question of how did Klopp and the team get us to the position they did in all competitions prior to the FA Cup Tie against Manchester United? It was an amazing achievement to that point.

Overall, Liverpool’s season showcased resilience, impressive attacking prowess, and significant improvements while the same defensive frailties remain.

Tons of fun. Tons of excitement. A lot to be positive about.

Roll on the 2024/25 season!